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CASE NOTES

circumlocution employed." State, ex rel. v. Mitchell, 31 Ohio St. 592.
The Wisconsin Constitution, in common with many other states, in
Article 4, Section 32, declares that general laws must be enacted, and
that they shall be uniform in their operation throughout the state. "A
statute would not be constitutional * * * which should select particular
individuals for a class or locality and subject them to peculiar rules,
or impose upon them special obligations or burdens from which others
in the same class or locality are exempt. * * * Every one has a right
to demand that he be governed by general rules, and a special statute
which, without his consent, singles his case out as one to be regulated
by a different law from that which is applied in all similar cases would
not be legitimate legislation, but would be such an arbitrary mandate
as is not within the province of free government." Cooley Constitutional Limitations, 391.
In Johnson v. City of Milwaukee, 88 Wis. 383, at 390-2 the court
list8 certain well established rules by which the propriety of the classification may be tested. "One rule is: All classification must be based
upon substantial distinctions which make one class really different from
another * * * . Another rule is: The classification adopted must be
germane to the purpose of the law * * * . Another rule is: The classi-

fication must not be based upon existing circumstances only * * *
Another rule is: To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply to
each member thereof * * * ."Adams v. Beloit, 105 Wis. 363: State,

ex rel. Risch v. Trustees, 121 Wis. 44; State, ex rel. Morgan v. Dornbrook, 188 Wis. 426. In applying these rules to the instant case, one
cannot help but come to the conclusion that the statute in question was
special legislation. The constitutional provisions (Art. 4, Sec. 31, 32)
are certainly free from ambiguity. The language is plain, simple, direct
and commanding. It expressly prohibits the legislature from enacting
any special laws for the amendment of charters of cities. Since the
legislature attempted to do this very thing in Section 62.075, the statute
is of necessity unconstitutional.
CHARLES A. RIEDL.

CRIMINAL LAW-JURISDICTION-INDIANS. State v. Rufus, (Wis.)
237 N.W. 67. Fifty years ago, in a prosecution by the state of an
Indian for adultery committed on an Indian reservation, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided that the state courts had jurisdiction of
violations by Indians of state criminal statutes. State v. Doxtater, 47
Wis. 278. In this case the court recognized only two possible limitations
which might be imposed on such jurisdiction: existing treaties with
the Indians, and acts admitting the state into the union. It was held,
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however, in the absence of such restrictions, that the state court had
jurisdiction.
At about this same time (1883) the United States Supreme Court
denied that Federal Courts had jurisdiction of offences committed by
Indians, on the theory that the policy of the United States was to have
the tribes themselves punish them. In re. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556.
Very obviously, this gave the Indians undue liberties and privileges,
and so accordingly in 1885 Congress enumerated certain crimes, eight
in number, that were punishable by the United States. (18 USCA 548.)
This act was declared constitutional on the ground that while the
Indian was not a citizen, he was nevertheless within the geographic
limits of the United States, and therefore subject to the laws passed
by Congress for his protection. U. S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375. This
same case denied state jurisdiction for the very general reason that the
Indian owes no allegiance to the state, and the state offers him no
protection.
It requires little argument to establish the justice of protection of
the Indians by the United States; and the authorities overwhelmingly
concede this exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes enumerated in the
Federal statute. But Congress has enumerated only eight offences. As
to all the others, it has been held quite uniformly, and apparently solely
on the authority of U. S. v. Kagama (supra) that neither the United
States nor the states have jurisdiction, the intent of Congress evidently
being that the tribes should take care of these offences. There were
only three cases opposed to this line of authority: State v. Doxtater,
47 Wis. 278; State v. Harris, Id. 298; and Kitto v. State, 98 Neb. 164,
of which only the last was decided subsequent to the Congressional
enactment. For this reason the Wisconsin court felt constrained to overrule its earlier holding, and in State v. Rufus (237 N.W. 67) adopted
the majority view.
State v. Rufus involved the crime of statutory rape committed by
an Indian upon an Indian, and on an Indian reservation. Statutory
rape is not one of the crimes mentioned in the Federal statute. The
Wisconsin court denied jurisdiction, proceeding on the theory first set
out in Worcester v. Georgia (31 U.S. 515) and developed in the
Kagama case (supra), viz., that the tribes are the wards of the United
States, and are in a state of pupilage, and are, for that reason, exclusively under United States protection. The states, it is said, cannot
legislate as to Indians, for according to the Kansas Indians Case, there
cannot be divided authority. 5 Wall. 737. That is, both the United
States and the states cannot legislate on the same subject.
While the result reached in State v. Rufus was inevitable, it was,
nevertheless, another step in a somewhat unfortunate direction since
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it represents another unpunished crime. Against the reasons advanced
in the decision, several criticisms may be projected. At the outset, conceding the status of the Indian as a ward, it is only reasonable that he
should be protected as fully as possible, and not, if possible, by half
way measures. Since Congress has failed to protect him as against all
but eight major offences, what sound reason can be adduced against
the state's filling the gap, and providing for the punishment for the
other offences? None has been brought forward, except that since the
Indian is not highly civilized, modern complex laws made for highly
civilized society, should not be imposed on him. But it must not be
forgotten that while this argument was unassailable a hundred years
ago, it has lost most of its strength, until today it is of very doubtful
force, in view of the increased civilization among the Indians. Then
too, it is doubtful whether our modern criminal laws are actually so
much more complex and more unsuited to a "primitive" people than
were the laws of several hundred years ago.
It has been said further that the-states shall not legislate on this
subject since that is a matter exclusively for Congress. This exclusive
right is rested on the theory that the Indians are wards of the United
States, owe no allegiance to the states, and, what is more important,
receive no protection from the states. But even conceding so broad a
statement that the State does not protect the Indian, is it not largely
because the federal government has taken from the states the right
to legislate as to the Indian that the states are not offering the Indian
the protection to which he may be entitled?
While the writer has no reason fervently to espouse the cause of
the Indian, yet it seems to him that a humanitarian public policy should
dictate fuller protection of the Indian. The present state of the law
falls short of this. But state legislation would seem constitutionally
possible, and not at all unsatisfactory.
M. WESLEY KuswA.

In the case
of Fisher vs. Godman, et al., 237 N.W. 93 (Wis.), the plaintiff sought
to obtain a mandatory injunction ordering the defendants to remove a
part of their building which protruded into the soil of her lot. The
complaint alleged that, in the process of constructing an apartment
building on their own property, the defendants excavated and removed
a portion of her lot and built the heavy foundation and wall which
projected into her land and which the defendants claimed they had a
right to maintain. It further alleged that the plaintiff was thereby prevented from the full use and enjoyment of her property, that the value
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